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Introduction
In Connick v. Myers' the Supreme Court developed a test to de-
termine whether a public employer's sanctions of an employee for ex-
pression receives First Amendment scrutiny. This test hinges upon
whether a court finds that the expression addresses a matter of "public
concern" as a matter of law.2 If a court finds the expression to be
unrelated to a matter of public concern, a public employer's sanction
for the expression will not be scrutinized under the First Amendment
absent the "most unusual circumstances."3 Therefore, under Connick,
a court's determination of whether an expression relates to a matter of
public concern is crucial.
The Connick test has drawn heavy criticism from scholars.4 The
problems stem from ambiguities in the decision itself: The Supreme
Court neither resolved how courts should determine whether the ex-
pression is of public concern, nor clearly outlined the situations in
which the test should be applied. Additionally, lower courts have not
satisfactorily resolved these issues.
This Note examines the Connick holding, highlights its guiding
principles, and argues how, as well as the circumstances under which,
the Connick test should be applied. Part I sets forth the three key
1. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
2. Id. at 148 n.7.
3. Id. at 147.
4. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public
Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1987) (discussing several problems with the Con-
nick standard and arguing that it should be abandoned); Stephen Allred, From Connick to
Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43
(1983); Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerg-
ing First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990) (both citing the lack of
consistency among the different federal courts); Nadine Renee Dahm, Protecting Public
Employees and Defamation Defendants: A Two-Tiered Analysis as to What Constitutes "A
Matter of Public Concern," 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 587 (1989) (noting that the ambiguity in the
current test leads to a chilling effect and suggesting clarifications); Matthew W. Finklin,
Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1323
(1988) (arguing the Connick standard is inappropriate when applied to an academic set-
ting). See also John F. Connolly, Connick v. Myers: Restricted Freedom of Speech for
Public Employees, 30 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 390, 390-94 (1983); Jonathan Allan Morks,
Comment, Connick v. Myers: Narrowing the Scope of Protected Speech for Public Employ-
ees, 5 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 337, 351-57 (1984); Gary P. Landry, Comment, Connick v.
Myers: A Matter of Public Concern, 29 Loy. L. REV. 1174 (1983); Andrew C. Alter, Note,
Public Employees' Free Speech Rights: Connick v. Myers Upsets the Delicate Pickering
Balance, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 173 (1984-85); Paul Ferris Solomon, Com-
ment, The Public Employee's Right of Free Speech: A Proposal for a Fresh Start, 55 U. CIN.
L. REV. 449, 462-69 (1986); Kevin Thornton, Comment, Dismissal of State Employee for
Distributing Questionnaire Upheld Where Speech Tangentially Affected Public Concern and
Questionnaire Had Potential to Disrupt Office, Undermine Supervisory Authority, and De-
stroy Close Working Relationships, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 365 (1984).
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Supreme Court cases. Part II discusses lower court interpretations of
the Connick standard and proposes a refinement. Part III analyzes
the applicability of the Connick test to other First Amendment
freedoms.
I
The Supreme Court Cases
For many years public employees exercised their First Amend-
ment freedoms under the threat of discipline by their supervisors.
This restraint was epitomized by Justice Holmes's statement that "[a
policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman."5
The United States Supreme Court subsequently rejected this
position:
[I]f the government could deny a benefit to a person because of his
constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This
would allow the government to produce a result which [it] could not
command directly.6
A. The Modern Four-Part Test
Judicial scrutiny of a public employee's claim that she was pun-
ished for exercising her free speech rights involves a four-step
analysis.
First, the employee must demonstrate that the expression ad-
dresses a matter of public concern.7 Unless an employee's expression
relates to a matter of public concern, a court will not scrutinize an
employer's reasons for disciplining the employee absent "most unu-
sual circumstances." '8
Whether an employee's expression relates to a matter of public
concern is a question of law determined from the "content, form, and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record."9 Thus,
protection is not limited to public statements: "[A]n employee who
chooses to communicate privately ... rather than spread his views
before the public" does not forfeit the First Amendment protection
5. Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-44 (quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E.
517 (Mass. 1892)).
6. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
7. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146.
8. Id. at 147.
9. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384-85 (1987) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at
147-48).
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that would otherwise be afforded.10 Although not every expression by
a public employee in a government office will constitute a matter of
public concern, the scope of public concern embraces a wide variety of
speech directed to political, social, economic or cultural issues."
When a public employee's speech concerns matters only of per-
sonal interest as an employee and does not concern issues of public
concern, such expression is not "totally beyond the protection of the
First Amendment."'" However, "absent the most unusual circum-
stances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to re-
view the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency
allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior."' 3
Second, once a court concludes that the speech addresses a mat-
ter of public concern, it still must decide whether the expression was a
"substantial or motivating factor" in the employment decision. 4 As
with the element of public concern, the employee bears the burden of
persuasion.' 5
Third, if the employee successfully shows that her speech related
to a matter of public concern and that it caused some action adverse
to her employment, the State bears the burden of justifying its action
on "legitimate grounds." Legitimate grounds exist when the State acts
to promote its efficiency as an employer, and not merely because it
disagrees with the speaker's opinion. 6 If the State meets its burden,
the court must weigh the detrimental impact of the expression on the
"interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees," against "the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters
of public concern."' 7
Applying this balancing, a court must not consider the statements
in a vacuum. "The manner, time and place of the employee's expres-
10. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979).
11. See, e.g., Green v. City of Montgomery, 792 F. Supp. 1238, 1251 (M.D. Ala. 1992)
(citations omitted).
12. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
13. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 385 n.7 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147).
14. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 249 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
15. Id.
16. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388; Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51.
17. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); accord Connick, 461 U.S. at
150-51. "Such a balancing standard reflects both the historical evolvement of the rights of
public employees, and the common-sense realization that government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter." Connick, 461 U.S.
at 143.
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sion are relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose."'" The
employer's interests involve the consideration of whether and to what
extent the speech in question threatened to disrupt the regular opera-
tion of the workplace either to impair discipline by superiors or har-
mony among co-workers, or to interfere with the speaker's duties.' 9
Finally, even if an employee prevails at each of these three steps,
an employer may still avoid liability by demonstrating that it would
have reached the same employment decision notwithstanding the ex-
pression. The rationale behind this fourth step is to avoid "plac[ing]
an employee in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitu-
tionally protected conduct than he would have occupied had he done
nothing."2
Courts have had difficulty applying this four-part test because
Connick neither defined what constitutes a matter of public concern,
nor identified situations in which this test is applicable. A review of
Connick as well as two other Supreme Court cases is crucial to a com-
plete understanding of this test.
1. Pickering v. Board of Education: The Supreme Court Announces a
Balancing Test
Marvin Pickering, a school teacher, was dismissed for writing a
letter criticizing his school board's allocation of funds among athletic
and educational programs.2' The Court recognized that employees do
not forfeit their constitutional rights by entering into public employ-
ment, but that the government's interest as an employer may justify
restrictions upon the exercise of those rights in some instances.22
The Court adopted a case-by-case approach,2 3 which will be re-
ferred to in this Note as "Pickering-balancing." The Court stated:
The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the inter-
ests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of pub-
lic concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees. 24
18. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. See also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439
U.S. 410, 415 n.4 (1979).
19. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388.
20. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 249 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
21. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566.
22. Id.
23. "Because of the enormous variety of fact situations in which critical statements by
teachers and other public employees may be thought by their superiors, against whom the
statements are directed, to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it feasible to
attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged."
Id. at 569.
24. Id. at 568.
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In Pickering-balancing, pertinent considerations include whether the
statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-work-
ers, detrimentally impacts close working relationships for which per-
sonal loyalty and confidence are necessary, impedes the performance
of the speaker's duties, or interferes with the regular operation of the
enterprise.25
Ultimately the Court resolved the dispute in favor of Mr. Picker-
ing, stating:
[I]n a case such as the present one, in which the fact of employment
is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the subject mat-
ter of the public communication made by a teacher, we conclude
that it is necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the gen-
eral public he seeks to be.26
2. Connick v. Myers: Limiting Scrutiny to Expression Relating to Matters
of Public Concern
Sheila Myers was an assistant to Harry Connick, the New Orleans
District Attorney.27 Myers opposed her transfer to a different section
of the criminal court.28 Myers prepared and distributed to the other
assistants a questionnaire concerning office transfer policy, morale,
dispute resolution, the level of confidence in various supervisors and
whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns.29
Connick then told Myers that she was being terminated for refusal to
accept the transfer and that he considered distribution of the ques-
tionnaire an act of insubordination. Myers filed suit contending that
she was wrongfully discharged for exercising her First Amendment
rights.3°
The Court's holding in Connick resolved a clash between the First
Amendment rights of public employees and the need to avoid inter-
fering with public employers by scrutinizing every employment deci-
sion. On one hand, the Court was concerned with protecting the First
Amendment rights of those working for public employers. It noted:
"[O]ur responsibility is to ensure that citizens are not deprived of fun-
damental rights by virtue of working for the government. ,31 This
is important because without this protection the vast numbers of citi-
zens who work for the government could be silenced by their employ-
25. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570-73).
26. Pickering v. Board of Educ. 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1961).
27. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 141.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 147.
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ers on important issues.3 2 On the other hand, the Court recognized
that a public employer could not function effectively if it must defend
a federal lawsuit over every employment decision allegedly made in
reaction to an employee's expression. 3
In an effort to create a standard addressing these two concerns,
Justice White's majority opinion drew a distinction between speech by
an employee that addresses a matter of "public concern" and speech
that addresses a matter of "private interest. '34 The Court held that if
speech does not relate to a matter of public concern, a court shall
defer to the employer's decision to discipline the employee absent
"most unusual circumstances. '35
The Court stated that "[w]hen employee expression cannot be
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide lat-
itude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judi-
ciary in the name of the First Amendment. ' 36 The Court added that
speech unrelated to matters of public concern is still afforded some
protection, but it did not specify how much.37
Using this analysis, the Court held that the only question on My-
ers's questionnaire regarding pressure to work in political campaigns
addressed a matter of public concern.3 8 The remaining questions were
deemed merely personal grievances or extensions of her personal dis-
satisfaction with the status quo.3 9 The Court ruled that the overall
survey had touched on issues of public concern in a very limited sense,
and was more properly characterized as a personal grievance.40
Ultimately, the Court held that the potential of Myers's action to
disrupt the operation of the District Attorney's office outweighed the
limited First Amendment protection afforded her speech.4'
32. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 4, at 6-8.
33. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143.
34. Id. at 147.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 146.
37. Id. at 147.
38. Id. at 149.
39. Id. at 148.
40. Id.
41. "We do not suggest ... that [speech] even if not touching upon a matter of public
concern ... is totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment... [but if it does not
touch on such matters] government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their
offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."
Id. at 146-47.
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3. Rankin v. McPherson: The Court's Second Application of the Connick
Test
McPherson was a data-entry employee in a county constable's of-
fice. She was fired because after she heard of the assassination at-
tempt on President Reagan, she told her boyfriend that "if they go for
him again, I hope they get him."42
In holding that McPherson's statement "plainly dealt with a mat-
ter of public concern"43 the Supreme Court stressed the fact that "the
statement was made in the course of a conversation about the policies
of the President's administration."" The Court noted that although
deference is necessary to employers in some instances under the Con-
nick test "[v]igilance is necessary to ensure that public employers do
not use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it
hampers public functions but simply because superiors disagree with
the content of employees' speech."4
As in Connick, the majority did not state how courts should de-
termine what speech relates to a matter of public concern. However,
in his dissent Justice Scalia characterized the method used by the
majority:
[T]here is no basis for the Court's suggestion.., that McPherson's
criticisms of the President's policies that immediately preceded the
remark can illuminate it in such a fashion as to render it constitu-
tionally protected. Those criticisms merely reveal the speaker's mo-
tive.. 46
Thus, it appears that the method the majority used to determine
whether the speech involved a matter of public concern heavily em-
phasized the motivation behind the speaker's expression.
II
Application and Refinement of the Connick Test
A. The Unpredictable Outcome of the Connick Test
Courts have encountered many problems in applying the Connick
test. The first problem is determining what constitutes a "matter of
public concern."' As noted, Connick requires a judge to decide this
issue as a matter of law,48 yet the opinion provides little guidance.49
42. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987).
43. Id. at 386.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 384.
46. Id. at 396 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. See generally supra note 4.
48. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983); Brinkmeyer v. Thrall Indep. Sch.
Dist., 786 F.2d 1291, 1295 n.4 (5th Cir. 1986). But for a criticism of this approach, see J.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 16:525
FIRST AMENDMENT AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
The dissent in Connick feared that under this test First Amendment
protection would be based upon whether a judge feels the subject is
sufficiently important to merit protection.5 ° In fact, some federal
court judges have made the outcome of the Connick test depend on
their individual value judgments. 51
A second problem, closely related to the first, is that judicial sub-
jectivity will have a chilling effect on expression. If a judge utilizes
personal value judgments in defining a matter of public concern, an
employee cannot be certain that her speech will be protected. Such
uncertainty may make a person hesitant to express herself. As one
commentator has observed:
Employees may fear that if they speak out, they will lose their jobs,
forfeit salary increase, or be denied promotions. In such circum-
stances, the most prudent thing is to do nothing. Unless the oppor-
tunity to speak without penalty is clear and readily enforceable self-
imposed censorship [will be] imposed on many nervous people who
live on narrow economic margins.52
The Connick Court noted that First Amendment freedoms must
be protected against this sort of chilling effect:
[In all of the cases preceding Connick] [t]he issue was whether gov-
ernment employees could be prevented or 'chilled' by the fear of
discharge from joining political parties and other associations that
certain public officials might find 'subversive'. . . The First Amend-
ment was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people.5 3
Wilson Parker, The Constitutional Status of Public Employee Speech: A Question for the
Jury, 65 B.U. L. REV. 483 (1985).
49. Connick, 461 U.S. at 154 ("[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to
attempt to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged.").
The Court did state what evidence would be considered in making the threshold determi-
nation of whether an employee's speech regards a matter of public concern: "Whether an
employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the con-
tent, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147-
48.
50. "[B]ased on its own narrow conception of which matters are of public concern, [a]
[c]ourt implicitly determines that information concerning employee morale at an important
government office will not inform public debate. To the contrary, the First Amendment
protects the dissemination of such information so that the people, not the courts, may
evaluate its usefulness." Connick, 461 U.S. at 164-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-18, at 930-31 n.15 (2d ed.
1988) ("[The Connick] approach invited the Court to engage in standardless balancing and
subjective, content-based determination of the social importance of speech ... ").
51. For example, at the trial level in Rankin v. McPherson the court ruled against
McPherson stating "I don't think it is a matter of public concern to approve even more to
[sic] the second attempt at assassination." Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 n.8
(1987) (quoting the record) (emphasis added).
52. Massaro, supra note 4, at 7-8 (citations omitted).
53. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1983).
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However, there is a potential problem with curbing the discretion
of courts in deciding the outcome of the Connick test. The problem
arises when the expression would normally be deemed unrelated to a
matter of public concern, yet the facts compel the court and the
speaker to call for protection of the expression.54 If courts were to
afford protection to speech unrelated to a matter of public concern,
the circumstances must be clearly defined and consistent with Con-
nick's goals.
B. The Content, Form and Context Standard
Many courts have adopted interpretations of the Connick test
which focus on the Court's statement that "[w]hether an employee's
speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by
the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the
whole record."55 In these elements: (1) content refers to the subject
matter of the expression; (2) form refers to how it was conveyed; and
(3) context refers to where and why the expression was made 6.5  Vari-
ations on this approach have been emerging since the latter half of the
1980s.17 This trend will be referred to as the "content, form and con-
text" (CFC) standard.
The CFC approach is flawed because the outcome of a court's
analysis depends upon a judge's subjective determination of what sub-
jects or circumstances cause speech to be protected. Further, the
Supreme Court offered no guidance on the relative importance of
each factor. If the prongs of the CFC do not suggest the same conclu-
sion, a judge determines which of the three factors is most important.
Either way, an employee will have difficulty predicting whether her
expression will be protected.
Even if a court employs an objective inquiry as to whether the
subject matter or the form of the statement makes it one of public
54. See, e.g., Massaro, supra note 4, at 29; cf. Edward L. Dunlay, The Public Employee
Can Disagree with the Boss-Sometimes: Cox v. Dardanelle School District, 66 NEB. L.
REV. 601 (1987) (formulating a test to determine what subject matters should be deemed
inherently of public concern).
55. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
56. See generally Dahm, supra note 4, at 623-26 (distinguishing these elements).
57. See, e.g., McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1983); Yoggerst
v. Stewart, 739 F.2d 293, 296 (7th Cir. 1984); Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th
Cir. 1985); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1988); Kurtz v. Vickrey,
855 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1988); McEvoy v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 466 (10th Cir.
1989); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 1990); Ayoub v. Texas A & M
University, 927 F.2d 834, 837 (5th Cir. 1991); Deremo v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 908, 911-12
(11th Cir. 1991); Copsey v. Swearingen, 790 F. Supp. 118, 120-22 (M.D. La. 1992); Grace v.
Board of Trustees, 805 F. Supp. 390, 391-93 (M.D. La. 1992).
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concern, the CFC standard does not effectively guarantee First
Amendment protection in critical areas. For instance, First Amend-
ment freedom should not depend upon whether the subject matter is
already a matter of public concern. A test which protects those who
discuss an issue after it has already become the subject of public atten-
tion, but fails to protect those who first recognize a problem and stir
public controversy on that matter, is inconsistent with the First
Amendment goal of fostering the search for truth.58
The form and context prongs of the CFC inquiry are similarly
flawed. To afford First Amendment protection based upon where and
how a statement was given is largely inconsistent with the Court's rea-
soning in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District.59
Courts employing the CFC standard are more likely to rule that ex-
pression relates to matters of public concern if an employee resorts to
newspapers, television or other avenues instead of asserting griev-
ances within the office." If this became a prevalent strategy among
disgruntled employees, the government employer's effectiveness in
providing services would be undermined. As noted earlier, the pri-
mary reason Connick limits scrutiny in the first place is to enhance the
ability of public employers to deal with their employees with minimal
interference.6'
Although the CFC standard is flawed in many respects, one as-
pect is not rejected here-that part of the context inquiry which asks
why the employee spoke out on an issue. A large number of courts
have embraced the CFC standard and held that although motive is
relevant, it cannot be determinative of whether speech regards a
"matter of public concern. ' 62 Some courts have emphasized the CFC
58. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009, 1012
(Brennan, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
59. "[The public] employee who arranges to communicate privately... rather than to
spread his views before the public" should not be required to forfeit First Amendment
protection. Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979); see also
Frederick Schauer, "Private" Speech and the "Private" Forum: Givhan v. Western Line
School District, 1979 Sup. Or. REv. 217, 230-35.
60. See Massaro, supra note 4, at 22-23 n.100.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
62. See, e.g., Berg v. Hunter, 854 F.2d 238, 242-43 (7th Cir. 1988) (allegations of public
misrepresentation of wage increases by employer held public concern despite entirely per-
sonal motives); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1201 (3d Cir. 1988).
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prong concerning the employee's reason for expressing herself,63
while others have stressed the importance of the other prongs.64
C. A Proposal: A Straight Motive Test
This new interpretation of the Connick test has three primary
goals: (1) to make the outcome depend upon a more predictable ba-
sis, instead of a subjective, value-based determination by the judge;65
(2) to end the chilling effect this subjectivity and uncertainty has on
expression; and (3) to provide a method to determine the "unusual
circumstances" under which a court should scrutinize sanctions of ex-
pression that do not relate to matters of "public concern."
This Note proposes that the speaker's motive should be the sole
factor in determining whether the expression regards a matter of pub-
lic concern. Courts also should abandon the practice of deeming cer-
tain matters "inherently" of public concern as it is subjective and
unnecessary. Finally, courts should scrutinize sanctions of expression
unrelated to a matter of public concern if such actions were spurred
by prejudice.
The intent of the speaker must be the focus of the test. If the
speaker intends her speech to further a social or political goal unre-
lated to employment, it should fall under the protected category of
"public concern." This approach finds some support in Supreme
Court cases.66
63. See, e.g., McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 1983); Yog-
gerst v. Stewart, 739 F.2d 293, 296 (1984) (7th Cir. 1984); Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d
1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985); Kurtz v. Vickrey, 855 F.2d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1988); Deremo v.
Watkins, 939 F.2d 908, 911-12 (11th Cir. 1991); Ayoub v. Texas A & M Univ., 927 F.2d 834,
837 (5th Cir. 1991); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1988); McEvoy
v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 466 (10th Cir. 1989); Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 495
(10th Cir. 1990); Copsey v. Swearingen, 790 F. Supp. 118, 120-22 (M.D. La. 1992); Grace v.
Board of Trustees, 805 F. Supp. 390, 391-93 (M.D. La. 1992).
64. See, e.g., Arvinger v. Mayor of Baltimore, 862 F.2d 75, 79 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding
that subject matter is the central element).
65. See, e.g., Allred, supra note 4, at 75-76; Estlund, supra note 4, passim (both noting
this problem and attempting to come up with a solution).
66. "Myers did not seek to inform the public ... Nor did Myers seek to bring to light
actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part of Connick and others.
Indeed, the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey no information at all
other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo. While discipline and
morale in the workplace are related to an agency's efficient performance of its duties, the
focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office, but rather to
gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her supervisors." Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983) (emphasis added). See also Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378 (1987). In Rankin, both the majority and the dissent focused on what McPherson
was trying to express: The majority looked to the motive for her speech and the dissent
looked to its content. Id. at 396-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Both are relevant: The motive
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This intent-based approach is appropriate to determine whether
speech deserves protection. If the Court wishes to reward and en-
courage speech aimed at furthering societal interests, the most effec-
tive way is to protect speech that the speaker considered in the
interests of society. By focusing on the speaker's intent, the test no
longer rests upon a court's subjective determination of the expres-
sion's value.67 Such an approach will ease the chilling effect and limit
the inherent subjectivity of each court's decision. Limiting the inquiry
to the intent or motive of the speaker provides a clear standard that is
understandable to the employee.
This approach would also relieve an employer from First Amend-
ment scrutiny in cases involving "merely personal grievances."68
Therefore, if the speaker's motivation was to turn her employment
grievance into a "cause celebre,"69 rather than to benefit or inform the
public-at-large of an issue the speaker felt had greater social impor-
tance, the speech falls under the category of "private" concern.70
should determine whether the speech is "public" or "private" and the content should de-
termine whether the speech falls into an "unprotected" category.
67. See McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1983) ("[Olne of the
fundamental purposes of the First Amendment is to permit the public to decide for itself
which issues and viewpoints merit its concern.").
Further, a court should not look to public reaction to determine if expression is pro-
tected. If a judge is permitted to base a decision on what she perceives the public response
to be, then it would allow a "heckler's veto." This should be avoided because the
"[g]overnment's instinctive and understandable impulse to buy its peace-to avoid all risks
of public disorder by chilling speech assertedly or demonstrably offensive to some ele-
ments of the public... [has been] one of the most persistent and insidious threats to First
Amendment rights." Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1001 (4th Cir. 1985). Rather, the
public reaction should be weighed on the side of the employer against the employee's First
Amendment rights.
68.
We hold only that when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of
public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal inter-
est, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate
forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public
agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior. Our responsibility is to
ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental rights by virtue of working
for the government; this does not require a grant of immunity for employee griev-
ances not afforded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the
State.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 148 ("[Myers] questions reflect one employee's dissatisfaction with a transfer
and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause celebre.").
70. "Pickering, its antecedents and its progeny - particularly Connick - make it
plain that the 'public concern' . . . inquiry is better designed . . . to identify a narrow
spectrum of employee speech that is not entitled even to qualified protection than it is to
set outer limits on all that is." Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564 (10th Cir. 1989)
(quoting Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 998 (4th Cir. 1985)).
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The speaker's motive can be assessed from the subject of the ex-
pression, to whom it was addressed and how it was addressed. 71 It
must be noted, however, that motive alone determines the amount of
protection given the expression. Accordingly, the prongs of the CFC
test serve merely as guidelines in determining the speaker's
motivations.72
The straight motive test has received some judicial consideration,
but it also has been rejected by some courts.73 In disavowing a
straight motive test, courts often point to Connick's assertion that
some matters are "inherently a matter of public concern '74 and there-
fore are protected regardless of the speaker's motive. Although this
position is supported in Connick, it should be abandoned. 5 The clas-
sification of subject matter as "inherently of public concern" opens
the door to judicial value judgments and arbitrary decisions. Courts
have deemed a subject to be "inherently a matter of public concern"
in one context, but not in another.76 In most of these cases simply
examining the speaker's motives would have led to the same result.77
This proposal's final goal is to enable courts to deal with the rare
circumstances in which an employee grievance merits constitutional
protection. This must be done in a manner consistent with the Con-
nick decision, but without granting courts too much discretion.
This goal can be accomplished by breathing life into Connick's
escape clause, the "most unusual circumstances" exception. Connick
71. See Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 495-96 (10th Cir. 1990) (discussing how to
find objective evidence of the speaker's subjective motive).
72. See id.
73. E.g., Zamboni v. Stamler, 847 F.2d 73, 78 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 488 U.S. 899
(1988).
74. Federal courts have recognized that although Connick's motives were personal in
raising the question of pressure to work on political campaigns, the topic was deemed
inherently a matter of public concern. Id. Although this is true, it should be abandoned
for the reasons stated in the text.
Rankin may be seen as a retreat from this position, relying much more heavily on the
motivations of the speaker than the subject of the speech. Cf. Rankin, 483 U.S. 378, 396-97
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing the majority overemphasized motive to the exclusion of the
content of the speech).
75. The majority in Rankin chose to investigate the context for her motivation in
speaking rather than adopt the view of the Court of Appeals that the "life and death of the
President are obviously a matter of public concern." Rankin, 378 U.S. at 385-86.
76. See, e.g., Hesse v. Board of Educ., 848 F.2d 748, 752 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
489 U.S. 1015 (1989) (stating that a subject that might be "inherently a matter of public
concern" in one context was not so in the present context because the expression was
motivated solely out of concern over the internal operations of the agency).
77. See id. Further, focusing on motive is important because otherwise "every employ-
ment dispute involving a public agency could be considered a matter of public concern
[depending on how the complaint is framed]." Barkoo v. Melby, 901 F.2d 613, 618 (7th
Cir. 1990).
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implies that in some "unusual circumstances" a court should scrutinize
an employer's decision to discipline an employee for her speech.78
However, no court has employed this language to justify scrutinizing
sanctions of speech on a matter of private concern.79 The Supreme
Court has made it clear that a showing of most unusual circumstances
cannot be made if the employer was unreasonable or mistaken in its
decision.8"
If an employee can show that her employer's motive was uncon-
stitutional under other provisions of the Constitution, a court should
scrutinize this claim as well as the First Amendment claim. One situa-
tion in which this exception should apply is outlined below.
A court should scrutinize employer sanctions for expression if the
reason the expression triggered sanctions was that the employer was
biased against a protected class of which the employee was a member.
A court should take this approach in all circumstances, regardless of
whether the expression relates to matters of public concern as sanc-
tions implicate the equal protection clause as well as the First
Amendment.
A good example of such a case is Rowland v. Mad River Local
School District."' Rowland involved a school teacher who was fired
after admitting she was bisexual. The jury found that Ms. Rowland's
statements did not interfere with the regular operation of the school
except to stir the anti-homosexual bias of her supervisor.8 2 The court
held that her termination was not actionable under the First Amend-
ment because her speech did not involve a matter of public concern. 3
Justice Brennan argued in his dissent from the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari that:
[Ms. Rowland's] 'speech' perhaps is better evaluated as no more
than a natural consequence of her sexual orientation .... Under
this view, petitioner's First Amendment and equal protection claims
may be seen to converge, because it is realistically impossible to
separate her spoken statements from her status. The suggestion be-
low that it was error not to separate the claims ... and-reliance on
that suggestion to avoid discussion of the merits of petitioner's
claim.., again simply exposes the Court of Appeals' reluctance to
78. Id. at 147; accord Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 385 n.7.
79. But cf. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., reh'g. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that some expression, such as 'coming out,' should not be
analyzed under the Connick framework).
80. "[O]rdinary dismissals ... are not subject to judicial review even if the reasons for
the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,
146-47 (1983).
81. 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
82. Id. at 450.
83. Id. at 451.
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confront forthrightly the difficult issues posed by [Rowland's]
case.
84
The action was motivated by prejudice against bisexuals which was
prompted by Ms. Rowland's admissions and, therefore, should be ana-
lyzed under the First Amendment and the equal protection clause.
If an employee's speech inflamed her employer's biases against a
protected class to which she belonged and this resulted in an adverse
employment decision, a court should review this as an unusual circum-
stance. The action taken by the governmental employer is unconstitu-
tional under the equal protection clause, 5 and dissenting against such
action should be protected regardless of the speaker's motivations. 86
This exception also should apply to employees who are not mem-
bers of the class but have been disciplined for taking a stand against
this sort of discrimination. This is necessary to protect the ability of
other employees to defend an employee subject to discrimination by
the government.
This approach supports the balance struck in Connick between
the rights of citizens who work for the government and the need of
public employers to deal with their employees without excessive over-
sight. In Connick, the Court recognized the government's dual role as
both an employer and a regulator. The Court also recognized that
government employees have dual roles as both citizens and employ-
ees. The Connick decision appears founded on a presumption that if
84. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009, 1017 n.11
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. See Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal.
1993); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991); see also Selland v. Aspin, 832 F.
Supp. 12, 15 (D.D.C. 1993) (finding plaintiff had a substantial likelihood of success in chal-
lenging military's ban of homosexuals). But see Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C.
1991); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990).
86. See, e.g., Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (citations omitted):
[Speech] may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unset-
tling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. That is why freedom of
speech, though not absolute, is nevertheless protected against censorship or pun-
ishment, unless shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance. or unrest.
There is not room under our Constitution for a more restrictive view. For the
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or
dominant political or community groups.
See also Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984):
The Constitution cannot control such prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.
Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect. Public officials sworn to uphold the Constitution may
not avoid a constitutional duty by bowing to the hypothetical effects of private
racial prejudice that they assume to be both widely and deeply held. Id. (citation
omitted).
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expression is akin to an employee grievance (that is, related only to
matters of personal interest), the government's interest as an em-
ployer will outweigh the employee's interest in expression. When a
government employer sanctions an employee for speaking on matters
of public concern, a court must weigh the competing interests of the
employee and employer to determine whether the sanctions were jus-
tified. Otherwise, the government could control the expressive activ-
ity of its employees beyond what is necessary to be an effective
employer.
In situations like Rowland this presumption is inappropriate.87
Ms. Rowland's employer did not fire her for performance-related rea-
sons; the government did not act to promote its efficiency as an em-
ployer. The decision was not merely "mistaken" or "unreasonable,"
but it was unconstitutional: The government fired her based upon her
membership in a class which several federal courts have since held to
be protected. 88 Likewise, an employee who is fired for supporting Ms.
Rowland should be protected because the government's interest in
terminating her should not be presumed to be related to its interest in
promoting efficiency. Therefore, these circumstances should consti-
tute a most unusual circumstance in which a court should scrutinize
the discipline of speech unrelated to a matter of public concern.
InI
Extensions of Connick
Although there are decisions to the contrary, 9 the better view is
that the Connick threshold test should only apply to expression occur-
ring at or relating to work.9" Connick stands for the proposition that
87. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1013 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
The recognized goal of the Pickering-Connick rationale is to seek a "balance"
between the interest of public employees in speaking freely and that of public
employers in operating their workplaces without disruption. Connick, and in-
deed, all our precedents in this area, addressed discipline taken against employees
for statements that arguably had some disruptive effect in the workplace. This
case, however, involves no critical statements, but rather an entirely harmless
mention of a fact about petitioner that apparently triggered certain prejudices
held by her supervisors.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. See Meinhold, 808 F. Supp. 1455; Jantz, 759 F. Supp. 1543; see also Selland, 832 F.
Supp. at 15 (finding plaintiff had a substantial likelihood of success in challenging military's
ban of homosexuals). But see Steffan, 780 F. Supp. 1; Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d 454.
89. Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1985) (Connick applied in case of a
policeman who was disciplined for performing in blackface while off-duty, although never
having made reference to his status as a policeman).
90. "[Tlhe Pickering/Connick framework was developed in the context of public-em-
ployee speech that either occurred at or was directed toward the workplace .... It appears
1994]
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an employee should not have to forfeit her constitutional rights in or-
der to work for the government; however, she also should not be able
to turn any employment grievance into a constitutional claim.
Flanagan v. Munger involved a police chief's order to police of-
ficers who owned a video store to remove sexually explicit stock.91
The officers challenged this order under the First Amendment. The
Tenth Circuit held the Connick public concern threshold test inappli-
cable in cases in which the employee engages in nonverbal protected
expression neither at work nor concerning work:
The [public/private] test helps define public concern in an area in
which the critical distinction should be whether the speech at issue
takes on significance outside the workplace or whether it deals pri-
marily with an employee's personal employment problem. How-
ever. . . . [if] the 'speech' already [took] place outside of the
workplace the purpose behind using the public concern test is sim-
ply irrelevant.92
The reason that the Connick test is inappropriate in situations not
either occurring at or concerning the workplace is found in the poli-
cies underlying the Connick decision. Connick denies scrutiny of em-
ployee grievances so that public employers need not defend their
decisions in federal court.93 If an expressive activity is not one which
might be motivated by a desire to air an employment grievance, the
Connick test should not apply.
The Flanagan court held that the government's interest as an em-
ployer must be weighed against the employee's First Amendment in-
terests without the Connick threshold inquiry.94 Instead, the court
applied a Pickering-type balancing, modified to reflect any differences
in the interests involved.95 This is a proper approach.
The Connick test has been considered in several other First
Amendment areas, and the federal judiciary is often widely split with
regard to its applicability. These areas include the rights of public em-
ployees to associate, to testify truthfully at a trial and to petition the
government for redress of grievances (file a lawsuit or grievance).
that the better-reasoned approach is to avoid trying to force into the Pickering/Connick
framework cases involving allegedly protected expression that neither occurs at nor is
about the workplace." Rothschild v. Board of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 642, 653 (W.D.N.Y.
1991).
91. 890 F.2d 1557 (10th Cir. 1989).
92. Id. at 1564. See also Rothschild, 778 F. Supp. 649-54 (holding Connick inapplicable
after discussing the drawbacks to the approach taken in Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992
(4th Cir. 1985)).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
94. Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1565.
95. Id. at 1562.
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Courts have applied Connick to sanctions imposed on an em-
ployee for testifying.a6 For example, Melton v. City of Oklahoma
City97 involved a police officer who was fired for disclosing exculpa-
tory material that the prosecution had withheld from the defense and
for his testimony on behalf of the defendant at trial. The court prop-
erly held that Connick applies because the testimony related to work.
In applying Connick the court held that his expression regarded a
matter of public concern:9 His motivations for testifying were more
than a desire to turn an employment grievance into a "cause
celebre."99
Federal courts are split as to whether Connick applies to associa-
tional freedoms. One line of cases holds Connick applicable because
all First Amendment freedoms are cut of the same cloth;' ° another
line holds it applicable because Connick based itself in part upon free-
dom of association cases. 1 ' Other courts hold Connick inapplicable
to political affiliations citing Supreme Court cases on political
association.1" 2
96. See, e.g., Neubauer v. City of McAllen, 766 F.2d 1567, 1572-73 n.5 (5th Cir. 1985)
(police officer's testimony in grand jury proceedings held to be a matter of public concern);
Reeves v. Claiborne County Bd. of Educ., 828 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1987) (testimony
by an employee under subpoena in another employee's civil suit. held to be a matter of
public concern); Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding expres-
sion unrelated to a matter of public concern in case of police officer who filed a lawsuit
after having been disciplined for allegedly encouraging another officer to appeal her sus-
pension). Altman contains a well-reasoned consideration of whether Connick should apply
in these situations:
[In Connick, g]iven the essentially "private motive" for the speech, plaintiff's fir-
ing was not actionable ... Similarly, Altman's conduct, to the extent it can be
construed as speech, did not involve matters of public interest; rather, it con-
cerned a private personnel dispute ... This formulation dovetails with the Con-
nick rule that limits the first amendment protection given public employees to
pronouncements on public issues. Thus, a private office dispute cannot be consti-
tutionalized merely by filing a legal action.
Id. at 1244 & n.10.
97. 879 F.2d 706, 714-16 (10th Cir. 1989).
98. Id. at 713-14 (using a CFC analysis to reach this result).
99. It is important to distinguish between the motivations of the employee that brings
her own grievance and one compelled to testify on another's behalf. If one employee is
attempting to air a grievance while her co-worker is not, the co-worker is still under a duty
to testify truthfully. See Reeves, 828 F.2d at 1100.
100. See, e.g., Broaderick v. Roache, 767 F. Supp. 20, 25 n.9 (D. Mass. 1991)
("[A]ssociational interests should be analyzed under the same standard set forth in Con-
nick ... [because] I see no basis in the substantive law which affords freedom of association
a higher level of protection than the right of free speech.").
101. See, e.g., Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 1985).
102. See Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir. 1991); accord Boddie v. City of
Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ., 809
F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding Connick inapplicable to associational freedoms
without giving a satisfactory rationale).
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Finally, some courts either have extended or have rejected the
extension of Connick to association claims without discussion.10 3
Connick should not apply here because the act of association itself
cannot be characterized as an employee grievance. In addition, scruti-
nizing an adverse employment decision allegedly made on the basis of
the employee's membership in a protected association would not con-
stitutionalize what is otherwise merely an employee grievance. °4 In-
stead, courts should utilize a modified version of the Pickering test.'015
Courts that have considered extending Connick to the right of
petition (the right to participate in litigation as a party) have generally
held the test applicable.' 06 These cases get the right result-Connick
should apply in these situations. These courts, however, have only
considered the type of First Amendment right involved.' 0 7 It is not
103. See Petrozza v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, 602 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (holding that Connick applies to associational conduct without saying why); Gavriles
v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D. Mass. 1984) (holding Connick inapplicable to free-
dom of association claims without explanation).
104. If an association is unprotected, obviously Connick would not apply. Courts scru-
tinize employer sanctions only to "ensure that citizens are not deprived of fundamental
rights by virtue of working for the government." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983). Therefore, if an employer sanctions an unprotected activity there is no need for
constitutional scrutiny. However, one court indicated it might consider whether Connick is
applicable to association on a case-by-case basis:
We do not hold that the "public concern" analysis is a necessary step in all public
employee/freedom of association claims. In some constitutionally protected as-
sociations, "public concern" may be an inapt tool of analysis. For example, a pub-
lic school teacher fired for being married would have a colorable freedom of
association claim against her employer, but would likely not satisfy the public
concern test. We see no reason to treat speech and association differently in cases
like the one at bar, however, where, in context, the two interests are clearly
identical.
Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 498 n.6. (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted).
105. See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1204-05 (3d Cir. 1988) (utilizing a test
similar to the one advocated in this article in freedom of association cases).
106. See, e.g., Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 498 (10th Cir. 1990) (Connick analysis
applied to both free speech and right to petition claims in retaliatory discharge case); Hoff-
man v. Mayor of Liberty, 905 F.2d 229, 232-33 (8th Cir. 1990) (whether characterized as
speech or petition, employee grievance was subject to the same analysis under First
Amendment); Gray v. Lacke, 885 F.2d 399, 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (in right to petition retalia-
tion claim of public employee, first inquiry is "whether petition touched upon matter of
public concern"); Hickman v. Board of Trustees, 725 F. Supp. 1536, 1547 (D. Kan. 1989)
(petition for redress must address a matter of public concern to be protected); Belk v.
Town of Minocqua, 858 F.2d 1258, 1262-63 (7th Cir. 1988) (Connick applicable to right-of-
petition cases); Stalter v. City of Montgomery, 796 F. Supp. 489 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (filing of
fire fighter's grievance over order to shave chest hair subject to the Connick public/private
concern test, and therefore unprotected from sanctions). But cf. McCoy v. Goldin, 598 F.
Supp. 310, 314-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding Connick's public concern requirement inappli-
cable to the right of access to courts).
107. See, e.g., Stalter v. City of Montgomery, 796 F. Supp. 489, 494 (M.D. Ala. 1992)
("To accept Plaintiff's argument [that Connick does not apply to the right of petition]
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enough to say that Connick should apply because the right asserted is
found in the First Amendment. A court must also consider whether
scrutinizing these claims would be akin to giving constitutional protec-
tion to employee grievances. Allowing a public employee to gain
scrutiny of an adverse employment decision in these circumstances
would "require a grant of immunity for employee grievances not af-
forded by the First Amendment to those who do not work for the
state.'10
8
Another line of case law holds that an employee does not have to
contend with Connick if she uses grievance procedures that were col-
lectively bargained for, even if she would not otherwise be able to gain
constitutional scrutiny. These courts reason that the fruits of collec-
tive bargaining implicate the right to associate.' 019 These cases miscon-
strue Connick. Although it might implicate the right to associate, a
grievance filed through a union is no less an employee grievance than
one aired at work. This approach clearly violates Connick's edict




Connick v. Myers represents a balance between the expressive
rights of public employees and the need of government agencies to
provide services efficiently. A citizen employed by the government
should not be required to forfeit her constitutional rights; a public em-
ployer is an arm of the government and cannot deny its employees
their fundamental rights. However, an employer must be able to dis-
cipline employees whose expressive activities inhibit the effectiveness
of the employer's services.
The Connick Court held that if the expression is unrelated to
matters of public concern, such as employment grievances, absent
would be necessarily to conclude that Plaintiff's rights under the petition clause of the First
Amendment are separate and distinct from his rights under the free speech clause of that
amendment.")
108. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
109. See Stellmaker v. DePetrillo, 710 F. Supp. 891 (D. Conn. 1989) (right of public
employee to file grievance under procedures established through collective bargaining im-
plicates both petition and association rights and, therefore, Connick public concern analy-
sis inapplicable); Gavriles v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D. Mass. 1984). But see
Broderick v. Roache, 767 F. Supp. 20, 25 n.9 (D.C. Mass. 1991) (holding Connick applica-
ble to negotiated union grievances; rejecting Stellmaker). Cf. Day v. South Park Indep.
Sch. Dist., 768 F.2d 696, 701-03 (5th Cir. 1985) (the fact that employee chose to put her
speech in formal grievance did not remove her petition claim from public concern analysis,
absent implication of association rights).
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most unusual circumstances a federal court will not scrutinize the rea-
sons for sanctions. Thus, Connick provides the scope of protected
expression.
The boundary between protected and unprotected expression
must be clearly drawn and protect employees from being forced to
forfeit their constitutional rights. Courts should examine the subjec-
tive motivation of the speaker to determine whether the expression
was merely an employee grievance. Further, courts should scrutinize
allegations that a decision to sanction was spawned from prejudice,
stirred by the expression of membership in a protected class.
In deciding whether Connick should be expanded to new situa-
tions courts should look to what Connick represents and whether
those concerns are present in a particular case. Courts should ask two
questions in considering whether to apply Connick in a new First
Amendment situation: (1) Is the behavior protected?; and (2) Would
scrutiny of these claims constitutionalize what is otherwise merely an
employee grievance?
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